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COMMENT
JOINT INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT CLAIMS:
ADVICE FOR PATENTEES
Sriranga Veeraraghavant
Abstract
Liability for direct patent infringement generally requires the
presence of an entity that directly infringes all the limitations in a
patent claim. But, in some situations a single direct infringer may not
be present. There are two judicially developed theories of joint
infringement that address such situations: the "agency" theory and
the "some connection " theory. This article explores both theories and
provides some practical advice for patentees who need to avail
themselves of one or both joint infringement theories.
t J.D. Candidate (2007), Santa Clara University School of Law. I wish to thank William P.
Nelson for suggesting this topic and helping to develop the ideas presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to establish liability for direct patent infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a),' a patentee must show either that an infringing
product contains all the limitations in the allegedly infringed patent
claim or that an infringer performs each and every claimed step of the
patented process. 2 This requirement does not generally present a
problem to most patentees because the patentee knows the identity of
the entity that is making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing
the claimed invention.3 But, there are two situations in which a single
direct infringer may not be present. First, the patentee's competitors
may have arranged their affairs so that no one entity infringes every
claim limitation or process step.4 Second, a patentee's method claims
may have been drafted such that different entities must perform
different steps.5 In this case, a patentee will need to impute the actions
of one or more entities to one particular entity in order to show that
every process step is infringed.6 A patentee in these situations may
1. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2000).
2. This is the well-known "all-limitations" rule. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939
F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("To establish infringement, every limitation set forth in a
patent claim must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial
equivalent.").
3. The issue of joint infringement sometimes arises as a defense; an accused infringer
will argue that it cannot be held liable as a direct infringer because its products do not contain all
the limitations of the asserted patent claim or it does not perform every step in a claimed
process. For example, the defendant in Avery Dennison Corp. v. UBC Films PLC., made this
very argument. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. UBC Films PLC., No. 95 C 6351, 1997 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 13594, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1997).
4. Suppose that a patentee has a process claim comprised of steps 1, 2 and 3. Also
suppose that "infringer" X performs only steps 2 and 3, but hires Y to perform step 1. Since
neither X nor Y perform all three steps as required by the claim they cannot be considered direct
infringers. An illustration of this situation can be found in Metal Film Co. v. Melton Co., 316 F.
Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Metal Film, the infringer contracted with a third party to perform
one of the steps in a patented process. Id. at 110 n.12.
5. Claims that require one entity to perform certain steps and another entity to perform
other steps are sometimes referred to as "divided" or "distributed" claims. See Mark A. Lemley
et. al., Divided Infringement Claims, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 100, at 1 (Dec. 1,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-628241. Divided claims are often present in Internet
based inventions. For example, in Hill v. Amazon, an asserted claim required some steps to be
preformed on a "main computer" controlled by one party while others had to be performed on a
"remote computer" controlled by a different party. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389, at *14-15 (E.D. Tex, Jan. 19, 2006).
6. For example, in Hill, the plaintiff's claims were drafted in a way that required the
primary entity to perform some steps on its computer and then transmit the result to the
secondary entity that performed several more steps before returning a result to the primary
entity's computer, Id. at *13-14. Since neither the primary entity nor the secondary entity
performed every step in the claimed invention, the plaintiff needed to resort to a theory that
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want to avail itself of a theory of indirect infringement by arguing that
the entity is either actively inducing another to infringe or is
contributing to another's infringement.' Although these theories may
seem appealing, a patentee cannot resort to them unless it shows that
a direct infringer is present because direct infringement is considered
a prerequisite for establishing liability under both indirect
infringement theories.8
But, a patentee is not without recourse because of two judicially
developed theories of joint infringement: the "agency" theory and the
"some connection" theory. The "agency" theory was first recognized
in the 1940s, 9 while the "some connection" theory is a much more
recent judicial development.' ° The "some connection" theory reduces
the traditional agency law focus on control and allows enforcement
against a broader range of infringing activities. In a pair of recent
cases the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") has
expressed support an expansive view of joint infringement." This
article examines the key district court cases that discuss these theories
and the related CAFC jurisprudence. The article concludes with some
advice for patentees who need to avail themselves of a joint
infringement theory. Generally, a patentee will be able to rely on the
"agency" theory, as most courts are comfortable applying agency
principals and determine factual questions related to the extent of
"control." But, a patentee should be able to convince a court to adopt
the "some connection" theory given the recent jurisprudence
surrounding that theory.
imputed the actions of the primary entity to the secondary entity. Id. at *15.
7. Actively inducing patent infringement ("active inducement") is covered by 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b) (2000). Contributing to patent infringement ("contributory infringement") is covered
by 35 U.S.C § 271(c) (2000). Active inducement and contributory infringement are generally
referred to as indirect infringement because the defendant's actions do not directly infringe.
DONALD S. CHISUM ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 860-61 (3d ed. 2004). Rather, the
patentee is arguing that the defendant indirectly infringes the patent because it is either actively
inducing a third party to directly infringe or is contributing to a third party's infringement. Id. at
861.
8. Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[A]ctive inducement of
infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the existence of direct
infringement .... Thus, either form... cannot occur without an ac of direct infringement.").
9. See Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1944).
10. See Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
11. See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004); On
Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus. (ODMC), 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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II. THE "AGENCY" THEORY OF JOINT INFRINGEMENT
The "agency" theory of joint infringement is combination of two
common law principles. The first principle is that patent infringement
can be considered as type of tort.12 The second principle, from agency
law, is that a master or principal may be liable for his servant or
agent's torts.' 3 Given that the hallmark of an agency relationship is
"control or [] the right of control,"' 14 courts applying the "agency"
theory appropriately focus on the level of control exercised by one
infringing entity over the other infringing entities.' 5 This focus on
control is apparent from the very first case to recognize the "agency
theory," Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools.' 6 Since Crowell, two major cases
have clarified the scope of the "agency" theory. 17 In addition, the
CAFC recently expressed approval for the "agency" theory. 18 This
section discusses these, and other related cases.
A. Origins of the "agency" theory - Crowell v. Baker Oil
Tools, Inc.19
Crowell, the first reported case to adopt the "agency" theory,
involved the unusual situation where the potential infringer was trying
to show that an agency relationship existed between him and the other
infringing entities. In Crowell, the defendant, Baker Oil Tools, Inc.
("Baker") held a patent for a "floating and cementing device for well
casings., 20 Crowell, the plaintiff, was a Baker competitor who wanted
to start making the same device.2 ' In order to commence his
operations without fear of being enjoined for patent infringement,
Crowell brought a declaratory relief action to have Baker's patent
declared invalid.22 By the time Crowell filed for declaratory relief, he
had reached an "understanding" with an external vendor, under which
12. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (holding
that patent infringement is a tortious taking of an exclusive property right).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
15. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fitrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974) ("We
question whether a method claim can be infringed when two separate entities perform different
operations and neither has control of the other's activities.").
16. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1944).
17. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 253-54 (D. Conn. 1973);
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 733-40 (D. Del. 1995).
18. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
19. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1944).
20. Id. at 1003.
21. Id. at 1004.
22. Id. at 1003.
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the vendor would stockpile a large amount of the materials Crowell
needed to create infringing devices.23
Baker resisted Crowell's action by arguing that no actual
controversy existed.24 The District Court agreed and dismissed the
action on the grounds that (1) Crowell did not manufacture an
infringing product; (2) Crowell had no employees who manufactured
an infringing product for him; and (3) Crowell did not have a written
or oral contract with the independent contractor for the manufacture
of an infringing product.25
Implicit in the District Court's holding is the idea that agency
principles could be applied to patent infringement. The District Court
seems to have accepted, without difficulty, the idea that if Crowell
had an agency relationship characterized by an employment
agreement or a contract, that agent's actions could be imputed to
Crowell. But, the District Court does not seem to have recognized that
the important aspect of any agency relationship is the level of control,
rather than the presence of a formal agreement.26 The importance of
control, however, was not lost with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ("Ninth Circuit"), which reversed and reinstated the action.27
The Ninth Circuit held that it was "obvious that one may infringe a
patent if he employ[s] an agent for that purpose or [if he] ha[s] the
offending articles manufactured for him by an independent
contractor., 28 The key fact for the Ninth Circuit seems to have been
that Crowell was able to convince an outside vendor to stockpile the
materials necessary for him to build infringing devices in volume,
even without a written agreement.29 It is hard to imagine why an
outside vendor would spend its own money to purchase supplies for
Crowell to build potentially infringing devices, unless some sort of
control existed.
B. Applying Crowell
The first major application of Crowell occurred in Metal Film
Co. v. Metlon Co.30 In Metal Film, the plaintiff, Metal Film Co.
23. Id. at 1004.
24. Id. at 1003.
25. Id. at 1004.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
27. Crowell, 143 F.2d at 1004.
28. Id. at 1004.
29. Id.
30. Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Co., 316 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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("Metal Film"), sued Metlon Co. ("Metlon") for infringing its
patented four-step process for producing metallized yarn. 3 1 The
problem faced by Metal Film was that Metlon used an outside
supplier to perform the first step in the process. 32 Metlon argued that
since it only performed the last three steps of Metal Film's patented
process, it was not a direct infringer.33 The District Court applied
Crowell and rejected this argument, holding that an infringer could
not "mitigate [its] infringement of the overall process" by simply
choosing to have an outside vendor perform one step in the process.34
This very language formed the basis for the decision in Shields v.
Halliburton Co.35 In Shields, the plaintiff, Shields, had a patented
process for grouting offshore oilrigs.36 Shields sued Halliburton Co.
("Halliburton") on the basis that Halliburton had infringed this
process on four different grouting jobs.37 On two of these jobs,
employees from another company assisted Halliburton in performing
the processes steps.38 The District Court held that Halliburton could
not avoid direct infringement for those two jobs just because "another
[entity] perform[ed] one step of the process." 39
Although both Metal Film and Shields involved situations in
which only one patent step was performed by outside vendors, it is
unlikely that a court would limit these cases to only such situations.
Since the "agency" theory focuses on control as the basis for the
imputation of acts, it should not matter that an agent performed
multiple infringing steps, instead of just one, as long as control can be
shown. This is apparent from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Fitrol Corp., which highlights control as the main factor for
establishing that an agency relationship exists.40 In Fitrol, Mobil Oil
Corp. ("Mobil") argued that the defendants, Fitrol Corp. ("Fitrol")
and Texaco, Inc. ("Texaco"), were both direct infringers because they
had split the performance of Mobil's patented process between
31. Id. at97, 100.
32. Id. at 110 n.12.
33. Id.
34. Id. The District Court did not have any difficulty in treating the outside supplier as
Metlon's agent because there was evidence that Metlon and its outside supplier were "closely
related companies." Id. at 109 n. 11.
35. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. La. 1980).
36. Id. at 1378-81.
37. Id. at 1388. The District Court dismissed the action with respect to one job because
evidence of infringement was "inconclusive."
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1389 (citing Metal Film Co. v. Milton Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
40. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fitrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974).
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them.41 Although Fitrol and Texaco had performed different steps of
Mobil's patented process, Mobil had not shown that Fitrol controlled
Texaco's actions, or visa versa.42 The Ninth Circuit refused to find
liability for joint infringement stating that it "question[ed] whether a
method claim can be infringed [by] two separate entities ... [where]
neither has control of the other's activities."' 3 As the absence of a
showing of any control, in the Ninth Circuit's mind, foreclosed the
application of the "agency" theory, a prudent patentee who employs
the "agency" theory should try to develop some evidence tending to
show control of one infringing entity by another entity.
C. Expanding the "agency" theory - Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R.
Grace & Co.
4 4
The first major expansion of the "agency" theory occurred in
W.R. Grace, wherein the theory was extended to cover customers,
under certain circumstances. 45 In W.R. Grace, the plaintiff, Mobil,
sued W.R. Grace & Co. ("W.R. Grace") for infringing Mobil's
patents related to "gas oil cracking catalysts."'46 W.R. Grace used the
specifications in Mobil's patent to partially manufacture catalysts,47
but W.R. Grace did not perform the final steps needed to complete the
manufacture.48 W.R. Grace's customers performed those when they
used the catalysts. 49
The District Court held that W.R. Grace directly infringed
Mobil's patents because W.R. Grace effectively "made each of its
customers its agent in completing the infringement step." 50 The court
reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, the court found that
W.R. Grace knew that the remaining steps would be "promptly and
fully completed" by its customers.51 Second, the court did not want to
allow W.R. Grace to "achieve all of the benefits described by the
41. Id. at 291.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 291-92.
44. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973).
45. Id. at 211-12, 251-53.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Id. at 253.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 253.
51. Id.
2006]
218 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. [Vol. 23
patents" without incurring the expense of performing the complete
manufacture.52
The W.R. Grace court's view of who can be an agent for the
purposes of patent infringement is much broader than the traditional
view expressed in Crowell because sellers are not generally
considered to exercise a great deal of control over buyers of roughly
the same sophistication. But under the W.R. Grace view, showing that
the infringer sold its product knowing that its customers would
complete the remaining steps, is sufficient to demonstrate control.
The W.R. Grace decision may be based on the recognition that there
is an economic incentive in pushing the performance of some patent
steps to ones customers. The court may have wished to preemptively
stamp out this type of conduct and accordingly extended "agency"
theory in order to do so.
D. Limiting the expansion of the "agency" theory - E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co.
53
The E.I. DuPont decision is a significant "agency" theory case
because it established the minimum threshold for who could be
considered a direct infringer.54 In E.I. DuPont, Monsanto Co.
("Monsanto"), the plaintiff, had patented a process for making stain-
resistant carpet fibers.55 Monsanto sued E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. ("DuPont") for infringing this process.56 DuPont counterclaimed,
arguing that Monsanto infringed a similar process patented by
DuPont.57
The problem for DuPont was that Monsanto only performed the
first step in its process. 58 Monsanto sold the results to customers who
preformed the remaining steps of DuPont's patented process. 59 The
District Court rejected DuPont's argument that Monsanto was the
direct infringer. 60 Instead, the District Court found that Monsanto's
customers were the direct infringers because they performed all but
one step in DuPont's patented process and used Monsanto as their
52. Id.
53. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1995).
54. Id. at 735.
55. Id. at 688-90.
56. Id. at 688.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 733-34.
59. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 734 (D. Del.
1995).
60. Id. at 735.
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agent for the performance of the first step.6' In reaching this
conclusion, District Court found that it could not interpret Crowell,
Metal Film Co. and Shields as allowing a "third party who performs
[only] one step of a patented process and then sells the resulting
product" to be held liable as a direct infringer.62 While this holding
does represent a limitation on the extent of the "agency" theory, it
comes with a silver lining; since the District Court found that
Monsanto's customers were direct infringers, the District Court had
no difficulty in holding Monsanto liable for indirect infringement.63
For patentees, this highlights the importance of finding at least
one direct infringer, even if it is not economically viable to sue that
direct infringer. By using the "agency" theory, the patentee can
impute the actions of different entities to a single entity and treat that
entity as the direct infringer. After demonstrating the existence of a
direct infringer, the patentee can then resort to the two indirect
infringement theories, active inducement and contributory
infringement, in order to hold the "real" infringer liable, just as
DuPont was able to hold Monsanto liable.
In addition to clarifying the limits on the "agency" theory, the
E.1. DuPont decision is also significant because its reasoning sheds
light on the rationale behind the confusing CAFC's decision in
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc.64 In Fromson, the plaintiff,
Fromson, sued a competitor, Advance Offset Plate, Inc. ("Advance"),
for direct and indirect infringement based on the actions of Advance's
customers. 65 Fromson held a patent on a photographic printing that
was specially treated so that it formed an aluminum oxide coating on
it surface.66 Fromson's claims included a method for making such
plates.67 One of the steps in Fromson's patented method involved the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 737. Specifically, the District Court found that there was sufficient evidence to
show that Monsanto actively induced its customers to infringe. Id. at 737-38. To establish
liability for active inducement, the patentee must show that an entity that directly infringes is
present and that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted the infringement. Id. at 736. Having
found that Monsanto's customers were direct infringers, the District Court found that there was
sufficient evidence to show that Monsanto induced this infringement by providing support to its
customers in their infringing activities even after it had knowledge of DuPont's patent. Id. at
737-38.
64. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 1567-68. In terms of indirect infringement, Fromson argued that Advance was
liable for contributory infringement. Id.
66. Id. at 1567.
67. Id. at 1568.
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application of a coating to the plate.68 Advance manufactured
photographic plates, but did not apply the coating to the plate.6 9
Instead, Advance's customers applied the necessary coating.7 °
Although one would expect a discussion of joint infringement given
this factual scenario, no such discussion is present in the Fromson
decision. The CAFC simply notes that although Advance cannot be
held liable for direct infringement, it can nevertheless be held liable
for indirect infringement.7 1
In light of E.I. DuPont, the rationale behind the CAFC's
conclusion becomes clearer. Like Monsanto, Advance was not a
direct infringer because it performed very few of the patented steps.72
But, just like Monsanto, Advance's customers did perform the
missing steps.73 Thus, Advance's customers could be considered the
direct infringers, just as Monsanto's customers were considered the
direct infringers. Because of this, Fromson could hold Advance liable
for indirect infringement. Although this could be characterized as a
post-hoc rationalization of the Fromson decision, the close alignment
of the Fromson facts with the E. DuPont facts suggests that
Fromson may have based on the CAFC's implicit acceptance of the
principles associated with the "agency" theory.
E. The CAFC addresses the "agency" theory - Pellegrini v.
Analog Devices, Inc.74
In Pellegrini the CAFC directly addressed the "agency" theory
of joint infringement and seemingly approved of the theory.75 But, the
problem with Pellegrini is that, although the CAFC approved of the
"agency" as conceived in Crowell, the CAFC's decision did -not
actually rely on the "agency" theory.76
68. Id.
69. Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1567-68.
70. Id. at 1568.
71. Id. at 1568. Specifically, the CAFC found that Advance could be held liable for
contributory infringement. Id.
72. Id. at 1567-68.
73. Id.
74. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1118 ("Pellegrini's statement is correct insofar as Crowell held that one cannot
escape liability for infringement as a manufacturer of infringing products simply by employing
an agent or independent contractor to carry out the actual physical manufacturing.").
76. Id. at 1113, 1117-18.
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In Pellegrini, the plaintiff, Pellegrini, owned a patent for
brushless motor drive circuits.7 7 Pellegrini sued Analog Devices, Inc.
("Analog"), for direct and indirect infringement and indirect.78 The
problem faced by Pellegrini was that although Analog was a United
States corporation, almost all of the infringing products manufactured
and sold by Analog were manufactured and sold outside the United
States.79 Pellegrini tried to argue that Analog was a direct infringer
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) 80 because Analog's headquarters were
located in the United States and it provided instructions to overseas
vendors from the United States.81 The District Court rejected this
argument and entered judgment in Analog's favor on the basis that
United States patent law could not be applied extraterritorially.8 2
Pellegrini appealed this decision.
83
On appeal before the CAFC, Pellegrini argued that Analog was a
direct infringer because the actions of its overseas contractors should
be imputed to Analog under the Crowell "agency" theory.84 The
CAFC agreed with Pellegrini that the "agency" theory did not allow a
manufacturer to escape liability for direct infringement by employing
an agent or an independent contractor to manufacture an infringing
product. 85 But, the CAFC held that nothing in Crowell implied that
the "agency" theory could be applied to cover actions outside the
United States.86 Since Pellegrini could not show that Analog or its
agents committed any infringing acts in the United States, the CAFC
affirmed the lower court's decision.
87
The Pellegrini decision is both positive and negative for
patentees who wish to proceed under the "agency" theory of joint
infringement. The decision is positive for patentees because expressed
approval of the Crowell "agency" theory. The decision is a negative
because it imposes a territorially limit on the "agency" theory: any
77. Id. at 1114.
78. Id. In terms of indirect infringement, Pellegrini argued that Analog was actively
inducing third parties to infringe his patent. Id.
79. Id. at lll5.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0(1) (2000).
81. Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1115. Under § 271(f)(1), a direct infringer is the entity that
supplies the infringing product in the United States or causes the infringing product to be
supplied from the United States.
82. Id. at Ill3, 1115, 1119.
83. Id. at lll5.
84. Id. at 1118.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1119.
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infringing actions by agents must happen within the United States.
Although Pellegrini was decided in the context of § 271(f)(1), the
extraterritoriality limitation will likely apply to direct infringement
under § 271(a) as well because § 271(a) is also limited to actions
within the United States.
88
III. THE "SOME CONNECTION" THEORY OF JOINT
INFRINGEMENT
Although the "agency" theory appears adequate to cover
situations where multiple infringers are involved, the theory is still
based requires a showing of some control over an agent's actions. The
"some connection" theory expands the "agency" theory and allows a
patentee to establish direct infringement by showing that "some
connection" exists between the infringing entities.89 Although, as
discussed below, some courts continue to state that the focus is on
control, the level of control that suffices is usually much lower than
what is required under the "agency" theory.
The "some connection" theory was first recognized in Faroudja
Laboratories v. Dwin Electronics.9" The main cases that have applied
this theory are Cordis v. Medtronic Ave;91 Marley Moudlings v.
Mikron Industries, Inc.;92 Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc.;93 and BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech.94 In addition, the CAFC recently
expressed approval for an expansive jury instruction for joint
infringement in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries
(ODMC).95 Based on the cases discussed below, it appears that
district courts in California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New York
and Texas are comfortable applying the "some connection" theory.
88. § 27 1(a) only applies to unauthorized manufacture, use, offers to sell or sales "within
the United States" or imports "into the United States." See also NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
89. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987, *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) ("[Prior] cases indicate that some connection between the
different entities justified [a] finding [of direct infringement.]").
90. Id.
91. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002).
92. Marley Moudlings v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02C 2855, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7211, 66 U.S.P.Q.2D 1701 (N.D. I11. Apr. 30, 2003).
93. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2006).
94. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746
(N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
95. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc. (ODMC), 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
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After ODMC, more district courts may be willing to apply the
theory.96
A. Origins of the "some connection" theory - Faroudja
Laboratories, Inc. v. Dwin Electronics, Inc.97
Faroudja was the first case to recognize that "some connection,"
rather than an "agency" relationship characterized by control, might
be enough to establish direct infringement. In Faroudja, the plaintiff,
Faroudja Laboratories, Inc. ("Faroudja"), sued Dwin Electronics, Inc.
("Dwin") for direct and indirect infringement of its patented method
and apparatus for improving the image quality of television signals
derived from films. 98 Faroudja's patented method and apparatus
depended on a means for converting film frames into a television
signal.99 Dwin argued that it did not directly infringe either the
method or apparatus claims in Faroudja's patents because its products
did not incorporate any means for converting film frames into
television signals. 100 The District Court agreed with Dwin and granted
its motion for summary judgment.' 0 1
With respect to direct infringement of the apparatus claims, the
District Court reasoned that Faroudja could not show that every
limitation in its patent could be found in Dwin's products.10 2 In terms
of indirect infringement, Faroudja had tried to argue that Dwin's
customers were direct infringers because they completed the
necessary steps by purchasing or renting films that were converted to
a television signal. 10 3 The court disagreed with Faroudja. 1°4 After
reviewing prior case law regarding joint infringement, the court
concluded that direct infringement required a showing that "some
connection [existed] between the different [infringing] entities."'1 5 In
96. But at least one District Court has already refused to apply ODMC on the basis that
the CAFC's approval of the "some connection" theory was dicta. BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746, *11 n.3 (N.D. Tex. May 24,
2006).
97. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
98. Id. at *2. Faroudja argued that Dwin was liable for indirect infringement under both
an active inducement theory and a contributory infringement theory. Id.
99. Id. at *5.
100. Id. at *12.
101. Id. at *23.
102. Faroudja Labs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *12.
103. Id. at *17.
104. Id. at *18.
105. Id. at *15.
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addition, the court held that "some connection" could be shown where
the entities "worked in concert ... to complete the process" or were
in "direct contact."' 0 6 Although the District Court adopted this
expansive standard, it still refused to find that "some connection"
existed between Dwin and its customers, sufficient to treat the
customers as direct infringers, merely because they bought a product
from Dwin.10 7 Since Faroudja could not establish direct infringement,
the District Court held that Dwin could not be held liable for indirect
infringement either.' 
08
B. Applying Faroudja
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc. was the first reported case to
find liability for direct infringement under the "some connection"
theory.10 9 In Cordis, the plaintiff, Cordis Corp. ("Cordis"), held
patents covering balloon expandable stents and methods of using
those stents. 110 Cordis sued Medtronic Ave, Inc. ("Medtronic") and
Boston Scientific Corp. ("BSC") alleging that they infringed both the
apparatus and method claims in Cordis's patents."' With respect to
the method claims, the defendants argued thatthey were not direct
infringers because (1) independent physicians performed some of the
claimed steps and (2) no connection existed between them and the
physicians except for the sale of the stents, which, as the Faroudja
decision noted, was insufficient to support a finding that "some
connection" existed between the infringing entities.'
12
In affirming the jury's determination that Cordis' method and
apparatus claims were infringed, the court found that Cordis had
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that
''some connection" existed between the defendants and the
physicians. 113 The court concluded that the jury could have found
"some connection" for four reasons.'' 4 First, the court noted that the
106. Id. at*17, *19.
107. Faroudja Labs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at * 19.
108. Id. at *22.
109. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 350 (D. Del. 2002).
Although the court in Faroudja stated that "some connection" was sufficient to establish joint
infringement, the court did not actual find joint infringement using that theory. Faroudja Labs.,
Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 24, 1999).
110. Cordis, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
111. Id.
112. Id. at349.
113. Id. at 350.
114. Cordis, 194 F. Supp.2d at 350 (D. Del. 2002).
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defendants taught the physicians how and when to use the infringing
stents.'1 5 Second, the court pointed out that the defendants sent
sample stents to the physicians.' 16 Third, the court noted that the
defendants recruited physicians for clinical trials.' 17 Finally, the court
noted that the defendants talked to thousands of physicians who used
the stents on a daily basis. 1
8
The type of evidence that Cordis was able to use in order to
show a connection between the physicians and the defendants
illustrates the power of the "some connection" theory, as compared to
the "agency" theory. It is unclear that the "agency" theory, even the
expanded W.R. Grace version, could cover a situation in which
doctors, who were not direct customers, performed some process
steps. But, under the "some connection" theory, patentee is
empowered to look beyond the control exerted by one entity over
another and examine the amount of contact between the entities.
In addition to Cordis, another well-known case to have applied
the "some connection" theory is Marley Mouldings v. Mikron
Industries, Inc. "19 But unlike Cordis, Marley Mouldings did not really
present a situation that the "agency" theory could not handle. In
Marley Mouldings, the plaintiff, Marley Moudlings ("Marley"), sued
Mikron Industries, Inc. ("Mikron") for infringing its patented method
for forming window and doorframes. 120 The initial step in Marley's
method was the production of wood and plastic pellets from a wood
and plastic mixture.' 2 1 Mikron claimed that it was not a direct
infringer because it purchased pre-made pellets from an outside
vendor and therefore it should be granted summary judgment of non-
infringement. 22 The District Court refused to grant Mikron's motion
because the extent of Mikron's involvement with the outside vendor
was disputed. 23 The court found that material issues of fact existed
with regard to Mikron's control over the vendor and whether the
pellets were produced by the vendor based on specifications provided
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Marley Moudlings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02C 2855, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7211 (N.D. Il. Apr. 29, 2003).
120. Id. at*l1-2.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *6.
123. Marley Moudlings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7211, at *9.
2006]
226 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. [Vol. 23
by Mikron. 124 As the District Court was primarily concerned with the
nature of Mikron's relationship with its outside vendor and the
amount of control Mikron exercised over that vendor, the Marley
Mouldings decision could just as easily have been based on the
"agency" theory. In fact, the situation is a close parallel to Metal
Film, where the defendant was also using an outside vendor to
produce part of the infringing product. 1
25
C. "Some Connection" in the Divided Claims Context
Two cases, Applied Interact v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. 126 and
Hill v. Amazon.com, 127 illustrate the type of connection that is
sufficient to show that "some connection" exists between the different
infringing entities when the asserted claim is a divided claim. 128 These
cases are also significant because they clarify what kind of
relationship a vendor needs with its clients in order for there to be
"some connection" between the vendor and its clients. 129
1. Applied Interact v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. 1
30
In Applied Interact, the plaintiff, Applied Interact ("Al"), was
the exclusive licensee of four method patents that covered
communications between an "organizer" who broadcasts
advertisements or sweepstakes information and the customers who
respond to those broadcasts.' 3' Al sued Vermont Teddy Bear Co.
("VTB") for infringing the claims in its licensed patents. 32 Al based
its argument on the fact that VTB's website offered customers tours
of its factory and the opportunity to enter into sweepstakes for a free
124. Id. at*10.
125. See Metal Film Co. v. Melton Co., 316 F. Supp. 96, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
126. Applied Interact, LLC v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8713(HB), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
127. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2006).
128. Recall that a divide claim is one that requires that separate entities perform the
various patented steps of a process. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1.
129. Note that the Faroudja court refused to find that "some connection" based merely on
the sale of a product. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999). This left open the question of what
level of interaction between a vendor and its customers was required before "some connection"
could be found.
130. Applied Interact v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co., No. 04 Civ. 8713(HB), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19070 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
131. Id. at *2-3.
132. Id. at *2.
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teddy bear.'33 VTB argued that it should not be liable for infringement
because it had "no connection with its customers [because] they
independently performed certain [claimed] steps.' ' 134 The District
Court disagreed with VTB and found that VTB's contact with its
customers via its website was sufficient to establish "some
connection."'135 Specifically, the court focused on two aspects of
VTB's interaction with its customers. First, the court found that in
order to obtain a free tour or be entered in the sweepstakes, the
customers had to follow instructions imposed on them by VTB.
36
Second, the court found that VTB performed multiple claim steps.
137
This suggests that direct infringement could be found when an entity
performs multiple claim steps and then has pre-sale interactions with
potential customers or post-sale interactions with actual customers.
For example, when one of the entities has performed several claimed
steps, post-sale follow-up surveys or attempts to maintain a
continuing relationship with the customers may be sufficient to find
''some connection" between the entities.
2. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc.'
38
In Hill, the plaintiff, Hill, had patented a method for generating
product related information from a seller's catalog.' 39 Hill's method
required the interaction of two computers: a "main computer"
controlled by a customer and a "remote computer" controlled by the
product's seller that contained information about the product. 40 Hill
sued Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon"), alleging that the patented
method was infringed when Amazon's customers interacted with
Amazon's website. 14 1 Amazon moved for summary judgment of non-
infringement on the basis that it did not perform the "main computer"
step of Hill's method.
42
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id. at *11.
135. Applied Interact LLC v. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8713(HB), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
136. ld. at'*16-17.
137. Id. at *17.
138. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2006).
139. Id. at*13-14.
140. Id. at* 14.
141. Id. at *12, *15.
142. Id. at* 14-15.
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The District Court adopted the "some connection" theory and
held that "some connection" was present between the infringing
entities if (1) the entities had an agency relationship; (2) the entities
were in a contractual relationship; or (3) the accused infringer
"actually direct[ed] the third party to perform the remaining steps of
the [patented] method."'143 Under this standard, the District Court
denied Amazon's motion for summary judgment because it found that
Amazon designed its website to direct its customer's actions. 144 Just
as in Applied Interact, this suggests that when a seller has pre sale
interactions with a customer, there is enough of a connection between
the seller and his consumer to aggregate the infringing actions.
D. The CAFC takes an expansive view ofjoint infringement -
ODMC
145
In ODMC, the plaintiff, On Demand Machine Corp. ("On
Demand"), held a patent on a method for printing and binding books
based on customer selections.1 46 Under this method, immediately after
a customer selected a book for printing an automated system printed
and bound that book for the customer.1 47 On Demand sued Ingram
Industries ("Ingram"), Ingram's subsidiary Lightning Source
("Lightning"), and Amazon, alleging that the three entities together
with their customers jointly infringed On Demand's patented
method. 148 A jury agreed with On Demand and returned a verdict of
infringement. 149 The defendants appealed that verdict. 150
One of the issues before the CAFC was the jury instruction
regarding joint infringement.15 ' The District Court had instructed the
jury that joint infringement occurred if "the infringement [was] the
result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more
143. Id. at *17-18.
144. Id. at *19.
145. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc. (ODMC), 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
146. ODMC, 442 F.3d at 1333-34.
147. Id. at 1334.
148. Id. at 1336. On Demand argued that (1) a customer selects a book on Amazon, just
like in the patented method; (2) Amazon requests that Lightning print the customer's book based
on the customers demand, similar to the patented method; (3) Lightning printed the book and
sent it to Amazon, who provided it to the requesting customer, just like ODMC's systems
provided the customer a requested book. Id. at 1344.
149. Id. at 1336-37.
150. Id. at 1333.
151. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc. (ODMC), 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
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persons or entities."' 52 The CAFC stated that it "discem[ed] no flaw
in this instruction as a statement of law."' 53 But, the CAFC reversed
the judgment of infringement, holding that the joint infringement was
not present because On Demand's patent was primarily based on
onsite printing and no onsite printing occurred when Amazon fulfilled
customer orders by requesting books from Lightning.
154
The ODMC decision, like the Pellegirini decision regarding the
"agency" theory, is both a positive and a negative for patentees. The
positive aspect is that the CAFC endorsed an extremely expansive
view of joint infringement, one that covers infringement that resulted
from the "participation and combined action(s)" of the parties. 155 This
view does not seem to require the type of close relationship the
District Court in Medtronic focused on. It also does not seem to
require any direction over the actions of one infringing party by
another infringing party, which is a more expansive than even the Hill
decision. The negative aspect of the ODMC decision is that the CAFC
did not really rely on its assertion regarding joint infringement in
order to reach its decision, thus the statement could be considered
dicta. 156
E. Limits on the "some connection" theory
Several decisions have addressed the limits on the "some
connection" theory, starting with the decision in Faroudja. In
Faroudja, the court held that proof of "some connection" between the
infringing entities required more than showing that one entity sold a
device to another. 157 Subsequent to Faroudja, there have been two
cases that have explored other limits on the "some connection"
theory. 1
58
152. Id. at 1344-45.
153. Id. at 1345.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1344.
156. At least one court has treated it as dicta. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. No.
3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
157. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
158. See Classen Immunotherapies v. King Pharm. Inc., 403 F. Supp.2d 451, 455 (D. Md.
2005); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746
(N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
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1. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
59
In Classen Immunotherapies, the plaintiff, Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. ("Classen"), held a patent on a process for
identifying and commercializing new uses for existing drugs.
160
Classen sued two defendants, King Pharmaceuticals ("King") and
Elan Co. ("Elan"), alleging that, the companies had infringed its
patented process by developing and selling a muscle relaxant. 6 ' The
relationship between King and Elan was somewhat different than in
most other joint infringement cases: King had acquired all rights to
the muscle relaxant from Elan before performing any of steps in
Classen's patented process. 62 Under the sale agreement between Elan
and King, King's only contact with Elan was its duty to make
ongoing royalty payments. 163
Classen argued that Elan's actions before the sale and King's
actions following the sale should be combined to find that every
element of its patented process was performed.' 64 Classen argued that
the ongoing royalty payments that King had to make to Elan were
sufficient to show that "some connection" existed between King and
Elan.165 The District Court agreed with Classen that as long as "some
connection" existed between the infringing entities, their actions
could be combined to find direct infringement. 66 But, the District
Court refused to find that a sufficient connection existed between
King and Elan.' 67 In granting King's motion for summary judgment
of non-infringement, the court noted that absent "evidence that King
controlled Elan or that the two companies cooperated" in developing
and commercializing the drug, King and Elan could not be treated as
joint infringers. 168 Although this decision involved the sale of all the
rights to a product, the finding that ongoing royalty payments are
insufficient to constitute "some connection" between the entities,
suggest that in the context of a sale, something more than a simple
exchange of money is needed to show a connection. This would
159. Classen Immunotherapies v. King Pharm., 403 F. Supp 2d 451, 455 (D. Md. 2005).
160. Id. at453.
161. Id. at 453,455.
162. Id. at 455.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 455-56.
168. Id.
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suggest that devices such as pre-paid maintenance agreements might
be insufficient to constitute "some connection" between the entities.
2. BMC Resources Inc., v. Paymentech
169
The BMC Resources decision is notable not only because it
discusses a limitation on the "some connection" theory, but also
because of its thoughtful analysis of the CAFC's ODMC decision. In
BMC Resources, the plaintiff, BMC Resources ("BMC"), had
patented a method that allowed for individuals to process debit
transactions without using their personal identification numbers
("PINs"). 70 At least three steps in BMC's patented method had to be
performed by third party financial institutions.1 71 After learning that
Paymentech had a similar system for merchants, BMC sued
Paymentech for direct and indirect infringement. 172 BMC argued that
"some connection" was present between Paymentech and the
financial institutions because Paymentech provided data to financial
institutions.173 Paymentech disagreed and moved for summary
judgment of non-infringement on the basis that (1) it did not perform
all of the steps in BMC's patented method and (2) it did not have
sufficient control over the financial institutions to establish "some
connection" between it and the institutions.'
74
The District Court reviewed the existing case law, including
CAFC's ODMC decision, before adopting the "some connection"
theory. 7 5 BMC had argued that the District Court should adopt the
ODMC standard for joint infringement, that joint infringement is "
infringement [that] is the result of the participation and combined
actions" of more than one entity. 176 But, the District Court refused to
adopt this standard, noting that (1) the CAFC "did not rely on the
relation between the entities in its holding" and (2) the CAFC held
that the patent was not infringed regardless of the relationship
169. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech L.P., No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37746 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
170. Id.at*1-2.
17 1. Id. at * 12.
172. Id. at *4. BMC argued that Paymentech was liable for indirect infringement under
both an active inducement theory and a contributory infringement theory.
173. Id. at*'14-15.
174. Id. at *4-5.
175. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech L.P., No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37746, *9-12 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006). The court rejected the assertion that the CAFC's
decision in ODMC controlled because the CAFC did not rely on its statement regarding joint
infringement. Id. at * 11 n.3
176. Id. at *11 n.3.
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between the entities. 177 Instead the District Court adopted a Hill-like
standard for the "some connection" theory, holding that "some
connection" existed when the infringer "directed or controlled" the
actions of the other infringing entities. 178 The court found that
evidence that Paymentech provided data to the financial institutions
was insufficient under the "some connection" theory and that BMC
needed to show more direction or control. 179 Since BMC could not
show this, the District Court granted Paymentech's motion for
summary judgment of non-infringement. 180 This suggests that a
simple or routine exchange of information between the infringing
entities, without some additional element of cooperation or control, is
not sufficient to form "some connection" between the entities for the
purposes of patent infringement.
IV. ADVICE FOR PATENTEES
As noted earlier, there are two common situations in which a
patentee may need to avail itself of a joint infringement theory. The
first situation involves entities that arrange their affairs such that no
one entity infringes every claim limitation or process step. In this
situation, a patentee must to resort to either the "agency" or "some
connection" theory in order to establish liability for direct
infringement. The second situation, the divided claims situation, may
present the patentee with one additional option. Since the divided
claims situation involves process claims drafted in a manner that
requires different entities to perform different steps, a patentee may
be able to avoid arguing either the "agency" or "some connection"
theory during litigation by drafting its claims such that can be directly
infringed by the actions of a single entity.181
Of the two theories of joint infringement, the "agency" theory is
the oldest and the most likely to be accepted by a court because of its
basis in agency and tort law.' 82 In addition, Crowell, the case to first
formally recognize the theory, was recently citied with approval by
177. Id.
178. Id. at *20.
179. Id. at'*18-19.
180. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746,
*24 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
181. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 14. Avoidance may not be an option for all patentees. In
some cases a patentee may only be able to draft its claims in a divided manner because only the
combination of independent process steps performed by separate entities into a single claim
satisfies the 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) novelty requirement for patentability.
182. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1944).
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the CAFC. 183 Extrapolating from the case law, a patentee should be
able to employ the "agency" theory in situations where an entity
* Employs agents to perform infringing acts;
18 4
" Uses independent contractors or third parties to perform a
step in a patented process; 8 5 or
" Sells a product to customers with the knowledge that the
customers will complete the remaining patented steps or
finish the manufacturing to obtain the patented article.
i8 6
As the basis for the "agency" theory focuses on control, a
patentee who proceeds under this theory should try to develop
evidence that one infringing entity exercised some control over the
other infringing entities. If evidence of control is absent, a court may
rule that there cannot be any liability for joint infringement. 187
The second, and newer, theory of joint infringement is the "some
connection" theory. Generally, the focus of the "some connection"
theory is on the extent of contact between the infringing entities. The
recent CAFC's decision in ODMC seems to suggest that very little
contact is needed between the entities as the CAFC approved of a jury
instruction stating that joint infringement could be found when "the
infringement [was] the result of the participation and combined
action(s) of one or more persons or entities."',88 But, courts have
already started to doubt the viability of this standard,189 thus a prudent
patentee should probably continue to focus on whether:
• The entities have an agency relationship;'
90
* The entities have a contractual relationship;'
91
* The accused infringer "actually direct[ed] the third party to
perform the remaining steps of a [patented] method";
192
183. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
184. Crowell, 143 F.2d at 1004.
185. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 735 (D. Del.
1995).
186. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 253 (D. Conn. 1973).
187. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fitrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974).
188. Id.
189. A District Court recently refused to apply ODMC, arguing that the CAFC's statement
therein was merely dicta because the CAFC's decision was not based on the "joint
infringement" theory. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 37746, *20-21 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
190. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389, at *18
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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* The entities "work[ed] in concert... to complete the
process"; 193 or
* There is "direct contact" between the entities.194
In terms of specific factual examples of connections, courts have
found that one infringing entity providing samples or specifications to
another infringing entity is sufficient to find "some connection"
between the entities.'95 Courts have also found that regular,
continuous contact between the entities is probably sufficient.196 With
respect to customers, a seller or vendor generally needs to do more
than merely sell a product to its customers in order to have "some
connection" with them. 197 Pre or post sale contact between the seller
and the customers may be sufficient to show a connection between
the entities. 198 Similarly, merely making royalty payments is probably
insufficient to establish "some connection" between the entities. 199 In
addition, the routine exchange of information between the infringing
entities, without some additional element of cooperation or control,
will probably not be sufficient to form "some connection" between
the entities for the purposes of patent infringement. 20 0
A common limitation on both joint infringement theories is that
they are geographically limited to infringing acts committed within
the United States, 20 1 which is a limitation that is entirely consistent
with the CAFC's recent jurisprudence in other direct infringement
cases. 202
193. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
194. Id. at *19.
195. See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 350 (D. Del. 2002);
Marley Moudlings v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02C 2855, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7211, at *9, 66
U.S.P.Q.2D 1701 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003).
196. See Cordis, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
197. See Faroudja, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *22-23.
198. See supra section III.C.
199. See Classen Immunotherapies v. King Pharm., 403 F. Supp 2d 451, 455 (D. Md.
2005).
200. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746,
*22-23 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
201. See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
202. In the context of process, the CAFC recently held that "a process cannot be used
'within' the United States as required by section 27 1(a) unless each of the steps is performed
within [the United States]." NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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V. CONCLUSION
The case law regarding joint infringement provides patentees
with a way of aggregating the actions of multiple infringing parties.
Patentees have not one, but two avenues, for dealing with situations
involving multiple infringers: the "agency" and "some connection"
theories. The "agency" theory has endured for more than sixty years
and has been cited with approval by the CAFC.2 °3 It is an established
theory that allows patentees to hold infringers liable in cases where
the patentee can demonstrate some level of control by one infringer
over the actions of the other infringers. The "some connection"
theory, though much younger, has been adopted by many courts and
covers a broader range of joint infringement. Together, the "agency"
and "some connection" theories provide patentees with a good legal
framework for establishing liability against multiple infringers.
203. Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1115.
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